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On November 13, 2004, 
39 year-old RCMP 
Auxiliary Constable Glen 
Evely was killed when his 
patrol car was struck by a 
stolen pickup truck 
following a police pursuit 
in Vernon, British 
Columbia. Other officers had initiated the 
pursuit at approximately 0215 hours after 
receiving reports of a drunk driver. When they 
located the vehicle they determined that it had 
been stolen the night before. When the officers 
attempted to stop the truck the driver sped 
away. The pursuing officers broke off the chase 
shortly after it began as a result of the 
suspect's reckless driving. 
 
Even though the chase had been terminated the 
driver continued to flee. At the intersection of 
29th Street and 30th Avenue, in Vernon, the 
driver ran a red light and struck the patrol car 
Auxiliary Constable Evely was riding in. Auxiliary 
Constable Evely was pronounced dead at the 
scene. His partner was transported to a local 
hospital in serious condition. Both suspects in 
the stolen vehicle were also taken into custody.  
 
Auxiliary Constable Evely and his partner were 
aware of the earlier pursuit but had not been 
involved with it and were not attempting to 
locate the vehicle at the time the incident 
occurred. 
 
Auxiliary Constable Evely had 
served with the RCMP for 2 
years. He is survived by his wife 
and two children. 
 
 
On November 26, 2004, 49 year-old Ontario 
Provincial Police Constable Michael John Siydock 
suffered a fatal heart attack while investigating 
a motor vehicle accident on Highway 401, near 
Milton, Ontario. Other officers and medical 
personnel at the scene immediately began CPR. 
He was then transported to a local hospital 
where he was pronounced dead. 
 
Constable Siydock had served 
with the Ontario Provincial 
Police for 7 years and had 
previously served as a 
conservation officer 
 
The preceding information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 




The staff at the Police 
Academy would like to wish 
our “In-Service:10-8” 
readers and their families all 
the best for this holiday 
season. Once again, it has been a pleasure 
serving British Columbia’s police officers, and 
our other readers across Canada, by bringing 
them up-to-date on many of the issues facing 
them daily as they go about protecting and 
serving the citizens of their communities. May 
you have a safe and blessed Christmas and all 
the best in 2005. Remember, In God we 




Only a fool would risk their life without a 
reason—the Lone Ranger 
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FINDING FUN IN FITNESS 
Sgt. Kelly Keith, JIBC 
 
There is always controversy on stretching and 
its benefits—when it is most appropriate and 
how long to hold stretches for. 
 
Here's a re-cap of the most recent studies: 
  
1. Stretching should be 
individualized according to 
the individual athlete and 
their needs; 
 
2. For most benefit hold the 
stretch for a minimum 15 seconds; 
 
3. Stretching is most beneficial at the end of 
your work-out; 
 
4. There are no studies to indicate that 
stretching will reduce injuries; 
 
5. Active warm-ups reduce injuries; and  
 
6. Stretching and range of motion for an 
athlete can and usually will increase 
performance. 
 
Stretching routines should be designed to 
achieve one of four things: 
  
1. maintain or improve range of motion; 
2. be free of pain; 
3. recover from injuries that restrict 
flexibility; and 
4. achieve sport-specific goals. 
  
A good stretch is defined as "when you can 
perform a stretch but it doesn't hurt." 
  
Don't forget—if you are lifting 
weights—the negative portion of 
the exercise is often more vital 
than the positive part.  Try to 
spend twice as much time 
lowering the weight as you did 
lifting it! 
  
ABS: If you are bracing your feet IN or UNDER 
anything at the same time you are working your 
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abdominal muscles, you are losing a large portion 
of the benefit and working 
other muscles.  If you like the 
AB rollers, think about how 
you are moving your upper 
body to the curl.  Most people 
use their LATS to do this 
movement on AB rollers and 
thus are not working their 
ABS 
 
ORIGINAL CARE & CONTROL 
BROKEN, BUT NEVER 
REASSERTED 
R. v. Pike, 
(2004) Docket: C40852 (OntCA) 
 
The police located the accused’s 
car parked at a liquor store 
after a carwash attendant 
reported its driver appeared 
impaired. The officer saw the accused approach 
the car—with keys in hand—open the passenger 
side door and place a bag of liquor inside the car. 
The officer then approached the accused and 
asked him whether he had been drinking. He 
denied drinking that day, but said he had been 
drinking the evening before. A roadside 
screening test was administered and the accused 
failed. He was then arrested and provided 
samples over the legal limit.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
judge found that when the accused parked his 
vehicle and left it to go into the liquor store, 
care and control had been broken. However, in 
the judge’s view, care and control had been 
reasserted when he returned, keys in hand, 
opened the door, and placed the bag inside. The 
accused was convicted with care and control over 
80mg%.  
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in holding 
that the accused had care and control. Short of 
actual driving, the relevant test for care and 
control is whether the accused engaged in “acts 
which involve some use of the car or its fittings 
and equipment, or some course of conduct 
associated with the vehicle which would involve a 
risk of putting the vehicle in motion so that it 
could become dangerous.” The unanimous Ontario 
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the 
conviction, and ordered a new trial. 
 
In the justices’ view, there was no risk of danger 
by opening the passenger door and placing a 
package inside the car just before his arrest. 
The judge failed to analyze or address what may 
have happened, based on the accused’s earlier 
course of conduct, if he was not arrested. Since 
the trial judge had earlier found a break in care 
and control, there was no indication that the 
accused intended to resume driving by simply 
opening the door and placing the package inside.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
SEARCH WARRANT PROVISION 
ADEQUATE SAFEGUARD FOR 
PHYSIO RECORDS 
R. v. Serendip Physiotherapy Clinic et al, 
(2004) Docket:C40275 (OntCA) 
 
The police, investigating 
fraudulent and exaggerated 
claims and payments on motor 
vehicle accident victims, 
executed a search warrant for patient 
information at a physiotherapy clinic. The 
warrant, issued by a justice of the peace, was 
quashed by the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice because no special post-seizure 
conditions were imposed to protect the medical 
records. In Justice Ferguson’s view, since there 
was a concern about the privacy of health 
records, the patient records must be 
immediately sealed, notice must be given to all 
affected parties, and a hearing should be held to 
determine if the seized records should be 
disclosed to the police. Since these rigid 
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conditions were not followed, the issuing judge 
did not have jurisdiction to issue the warrant. 
 
On appeal by Crown, the Ontario Court Appeal 
ruled that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
erred. Unlike search warrants of law offices, 
media outlets, or psychiatric treatment records, 
no special requirements are necessary for 
physiotherapy records. Section 487 of the 
Criminal Code appropriately balances the state’s 
interest in law enforcement with the privacy 
interest and confidentiality of patient health 
records. As Justice Rosenberg of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal noted: 
 
The question…is whether the statutory 
conditions in s.487 of the Criminal Code strike 
the proper balance between the state interest 
in law enforcement and the public and 
individual interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of health records.  In my view, 
with the possible exception of psychiatric 
records, the section does strike the proper 
balance.  In the absence of a direct attack on 
the constitutionality of s.487, that section 
must be taken as meeting the requirements of 
the Constitution, including the privacy 
protections contained in ss. 7 and 8 of the 
Charter.  The section is designed to mediate 
between the state interest in the investigation 
and the public and individual interest in 
documents and other materials in which there 
is a reasonable expectation of privacy.  As a 
result of s.487, Parliament has permitted a 
judicial officer to authorize all manner of 
serious intrusions into the privacy of 
individuals.  If the requirements of s.487 are 
met, the police can enter a private home and 
seize the most intimate of records such as 
diaries and personal papers.  The Criminal Code 
does not mandate a further post-seizure 
process other than the procedures in s.489.1 
dealing with the return of seized property. 
Using s.487, the police can obtain financial and 
other records from third parties, material 
about the individual’s lifestyle, intimate 
relationships and even personal opinions.  They 
can gain access to a core of biographical and 
other information that is protected by s.8 of 
the Charter.  But, it has never been suggested 
that a properly issued search warrant, meaning 
a search warrant that was obtained in 
accordance with the requirements set out in 
s.487, authorizes an unreasonable search and 
seizure. 
 
It follows that the requirements of 
s.487(1)(b), in particular the requirement that 
the officer provide information under oath of 
reasonable grounds to believe that the records 
sought “will” afford evidence with respect to 
the commission of an offence, strikes the 
proper balance even where the target of the 
search is the seizure of health records.  By its 
terms, s.487 precludes granting of a search 
warrant for the purposes of a fishing 
expedition or on the basis of mere suspicion.  
Thus, where, as here, it is conceded that the 
medical records are not protected by privilege, 
the only mandatory pre-requisites to the 
granting of the search warrant are those set 
out in that section.  In the absence of a 
Constitutional challenge to the validity of 
s.487, I can see no principled basis for drawing 
a line around the types of records seized in 
this case and exempting them from the s.487 
regime and I can find no legal basis for 
engrafting common law requirements on to a 
comprehensive statutory scheme.[paras. 34-
35] 
 
However, an issuing justice retains the 
discretion to refuse issuing a warrant even 
where the minimum requirements of s.487 are 
met. Moreover, they may  impose conditions on 
the search and seizure of records containing 
private medical information, such as mental 
health information, but the failure to include 
post seizure conditions in every medical record 
warrant does not affect the jurisdiction of the 
issuing justice of the peace. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 




When we judge or criticize another person, it 
says nothing about that person; it merely says 
something about our own need to be critical—
Anonymous 
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FAMILY-VISIT UNIT A ‘CELL’ 
FOR PRISONER SEARCH 
R. v. Major & McBride, 
(2004) Docket:C39019 & C39286 (OntCA) 
 
The wife of a federal inmate 
attended an institution with her 
6 year-old daughter for a 
weekend visit in a family-visit 
trailer. The institution’s preventative security 
officer had earlier received information that the 
inmate’s wife would be bringing some marihuana 
and heroin into the penitentiary during this visit. 
Both the inmate and his wife were arrested and 
the trailer was searched, without a warrant, by 
correctional staff and police officers. The 
inmate’s wife led the officers to a rear bedroom 
where marihuana and heroin were found and she 
admitted to bringing the drugs into the 
institution. Both the inmate and his wife were 
convicted in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice for possession of heroin and marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking, but appealed to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that the warrantless search was unreasonable 
under s.8 of the Charter and that the evidence 
should be excluded under s.24(2).  
 
Section 8 of the Charter is only engaged if a 
person can demonstrate they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. In this case, both 
accused had standing to argue s.8 violations 
because they had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the trailer—a place the Correctional 
Service promised a reasonable amount of 
privacy—although the expectation is much 
diminished. Section 58 of the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act allows a staff member to 
“conduct searches of cells and their 
contents…for security purposes,” while s.52 of 
the Corrections and Conditional Release 
Regulations authorizes the search of individual 
cells with prior authorization of a supervisor if 
there are reasonable grounds it contains 
contraband or evidence.  
 
In rejecting the accused’s submission that the 
family visiting unit requires a warrant to search 
it, Justice Rosenberg, for the unanimous appeal 
court stated: 
 
In my view, when these provisions are looked 
at as a whole, Parliament's intention is 
relatively clear. In view of the reduced 
expectation of privacy in the prison setting, 
Parliament intended to give the Correctional 
Service power to conduct warrantless 
searches throughout the penitentiary. That 
power extends to all persons within the 
penitentiary including inmates, visitors and 
staff, and even reaches out into the 
community to a room in a community-based 
residential facility that is occupied by an 
offender on parole or other temporary 
release. If the accused are correct, the one 
search that must be conducted in a 
penitentiary with a warrant is the search of 
the family-visiting unit. It seems unlikely that 
Parliament intended such a result, given the 
broad warrantless-search provisions in respect 
of both other parts of the penitentiary and all 
persons within the penitentiary, which 
provisions authorize quite intrusive types of 
searches. [para. 35] 
 
Furthermore, although the word “cell” is not 
defined in the legislation, a living unit on 
penitentiary grounds still falls within the 
meaning of that term. Justice Rosenberg noted: 
 
I am, of course, somewhat uncomfortable with 
the idea that in this case [the inmate’s] wife 
and six-year old daughter were sharing his 
"cell". However, the family-visiting unit retains 
some of the attributes of a traditional cell. 
The unit is surrounded by wire fences and 
steps are taken to limit communication 
between people in the various trailers. The 
family is escorted to the trailer and locked 
behind a 10-15 foot gate. The units are 
monitored on a regular basis and the occupants 
must present themselves to correctional 
authorities on request. The unit becomes the 
inmate's living quarters where he is confined 
for the length of the visit. There are 
extensive rules about items that may not be 
taken into the trailer, including such routine 
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items as alarm clocks and radios. Even 
children's toys may not be brought in except 
with the authorization of the institutional 
staff. [para. 37 
 
Admissibility of Evidence 
 
Even if there was a s.8 Charter breach, the 
evidence would not be excluded, ruled the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. Although there was an 
intrusion into the living space of the accused and 
their daughter without exigent circumstances, 
the admission of the evidence would not affect 
the fairness of the trial and the officers acted 
in good faith. They sought out legal advice prior 
to the search, complied with the provisions of 
the Act and Regulations, and had reasonable 
grounds for the search. Furthermore there was 
a greatly reduced expectation of privacy making 
the violation not serious. As for the effect of 
admission on the administration of justice, the 
offence was serious and the drugs were essential 
to the prosecution. The exclusion of evidence, 
rather than its admission, would have a more 
serious impact on the repute of the 
administration of justice. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
IMPAIRED REASONABLE 
GROUNDS MUST BE VIEWED 
IN TOTAL 
R. v. Andrea, 2004 NSCA 130 
 
After following a speeding vehicle 
which ran two flashing red lights, 
a police officer activated his 
emergency lights, but it took five 
blocks for the accused to react and stop. The 
accused had a light smell of alcohol on his 
breath, glassy eyes with enlarged pupils, thick 
tongued speech, and fumbled with his papers. 
The officer formed the opinion the accused was 
impaired by alcohol and arrested him. A breath 
demand was made and two breath samples over 
the legal limit were obtained.  
At trial in provincial court, the judge concluded 
that the indicia reported by the officer—taken 
together—provided reasonable and probable 
grounds and the breathalyzer tests were 
admitted. The accused was convicted of over 
80mg%. On appeal, the accused’s conviction was 
set aside and an acquittal was entered. The 
summary conviction appeal court found the 
indicia—neither individually nor collectively—was 
equivocal and did not provide reasonable and 
probable grounds. The Crown appealed to the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal contending the 
appeal court judge erred in law in reversing the 
trial judge’ finding. 
 
Justice Chipman, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, held the trial judge’s finding on the 
existence of reasonable and probable grounds 
appropriate and supported by the evidence. He 
stated: 
 
As to the subjective component of reasonable 
and probable grounds, [the constable] 
testified as to his honest belief, saying that 
he arrested the [accused] for "impaired 
driving and over 80" and that the [accused] 
was, in his opinion, impaired by alcohol. This 
was not challenged. 
 
As to the objective components, I am satisfied 
that the appeal court judge erred in assessing 
the various indicia on which the constable 
formed his belief in isolation, rejecting each 
on the grounds of consistency with other 
explanations. The indicia must be evaluated in 
total… Specifically the appeal court judge 
reviewed the [accused’s] submissions that each 
of these indicia were equivocal or consistent 
with the behaviour of a driver who was not 
impaired. Although acknowledging that the 
circumstances must be taken together, in 
effect he weighed them separately, and 
concluded that the totality of the evidence did 
not overcome the equivocal nature of the 
parts. In doing so he also omitted reference to 
the [accused’s] failure to respond to the 
flashing lights of the following police car while 
driving five city blocks. 
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The trial judge's conclusion that the officer 
had reasonable and probable grounds was 
reached on the basis of the [accused] speeding 
on a major artery in Halifax at about 2:00 a.m. 
in the morning; (when traffic was light), failing 
to stop as required at two flashing red lights, 
being oblivious to the flashing lights of the 
following police car for five blocks; upon being 
approached by the police officer, finishing his 
french fries before speaking to the officer, 
exhibiting a light odour of alcohol on his 
breath, fumbling for his papers, having 
"glossy" eyes, large pupils and thick tongued 
speech. The trial judge's conclusion was not 
unreasonable. [references omitted, paras. 18-
20] 
 
The conviction was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
INTENT TO DRIVE RELEVANT, 
BUT NOT SOLE FACTOR IN 
CARE & CONTROL 
R. v. Mercer, 2004 NLCA 65 
 
After driving to a lounge, the 
accused parked his pickup truck 
and entered to play pool and 
consume alcohol over several 
hours. After midnight, he and  a 
friend went outside to the pickup to smoke a 
marihuana cigarette. The accused occupied the 
driver’s seat and started the vehicle, apparently 
to generate some heat while they smoked the 
marihuana. A police officer arrived, found the 
accused in the driver’s seat with his back 
partially against the driver’s side window, motor 
running, and window partly lowered. The officer 
observed indicia of impairment and read a 
demand for breath samples. Two samples of 
150mg% were subsequently provided and the 
accused was convicted in the Provincial Court of 
Newfoundland and Labrador of care and control 
with a blood alcohol level over 80mg%, despite 
testifying he had no intention to drive.  
 
The accused’s appeal to the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Supreme Court Trial Division was 
dismissed and his conviction was affirmed. He 
further appealed to the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Court of Appeal arguing he did not have 
care and control of his vehicle because he had no 
intent to drive, but rather intended to take a 
taxi home and retrieve his truck the next 
morning. Justice Welsh, for the unanimous court, 
dismissed the appeal. While intention to drive is 
a relevant factor in assessing care and control, it 
is not the sole determining factor. Instead, the 
circumstances as a whole must be considered. In 
this case, it was not sufficient merely for the 
accused to say that he did not intend to drive his 
vehicle. The court stated: 
 
[T]he vehicle was running and all that was 
necessary to set it in motion was to depress 
the brake and put it in gear. Further, [the 
accused] was not attempting to sleep in the 
vehicle. Rather, accompanied by a friend in the 
vehicle, he was sitting in the driver’s seat 
smoking marihuana, an activity that would only 
increase his impairment. [para. 9] 
 
The conviction was affirmed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
  
IMPAIRED INDICIA MUST BE 
ASSESSED COLECTIVELY 
R. v. Kuss, 2004 BCSC 1529 
 
Responding to a report of a 
possible impairer in a pick-up 
truck dragging a dog, a police 
officer located the vehicle and 
spoke to the accused seated 
behind the wheel with the engine running. Beside 
him was a dog with bloodied paws. The officer 
noted a very strong smell of liquor, bloodshot 
eyes, slurred speech, and fumbling with his 
wallet. As well, the accused admitted to having a 
“couple” or “a few” drinks. The officer made a 
breath demand and the accused was convicted in 
British Columbia Provincial Court of over 80mg%. 
However, the accused appealed to the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia arguing the trial judge 
erred in holding that the officer had the 
requisite objective grounds for the demand.   
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In dismissing the appeal, Justice Bernard ruled 
that the trial judge had a sufficient evidentiary 
foundation for concluding that the officer had 
reasonable and probable grounds to demand the 
breath samples. He stated: 
 
It is well established that the indicia of 
impairment need only give rise to a credibly-
based likelihood of impairment, and that the 
indicia must be assessed collectively. Whether 
there is a credibly-based likelihood of 
impairment is a finding of fact, and deference 
for such a finding ought to be given to the 
trial judge. [para. 5] 
 
In this case, the finding of the trial judge was 
well supported. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
PSYCHOLOGIST NOT AGENT 
WHILE SPEAKING TO 
PAEDOPHILE  
R. v. Gallup, 2004 ABCA 322 
 
The naked body of a missing 5 
year old girl was found in a 
brush pile. She had died from 
asphyxia, but there was no 
evidence to identify a killer. 
About a week later the accused, who knew the 
victim and had been seen talking to her the day 
she went missing, was arrested for car prowling. 
He had a suicide note in his pocket—expressing 
self loathing for paedophilic urges—and an 
extension cord around his neck. He was detained 
in a psychiatric unit under Alberta’s Health Act.  
 
One of the police investigators asked a 
psychologist for general advice about 
interviewing paedophiles and told her the 
accused was on suicide watch in the hospital. The 
psychologist knew the accused and worked with a 
colleague who had previously counselled him. The 
psychologist went to the hospital and advised 
the accused that his therapist had been in an 
accident and that he could contact her instead.   
 
While in detention the accused asked for the 
psychologist and told her he had difficulty 
controlling his intense paedophilia feelings. The 
psychologist, in turn, advised police. Later, the 
psychologist told the accused she had spoken to 
the police however, he again repeated what he 
had told her earlier. He also made some 
incriminating remarks to the psychologist. These 
statements and other evidence were sufficient 
to convict the accused  of first degree murder in 
the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.  
 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting the statements made to the 
psychologist. He contended that the statements 
were obtained contrary to s.7 of the Charter. In 
his view, the psychologist was acting as an agent 
of the state and therefore his right to silence 
had been breached. 
 
Justice Fruman, authoring the court’s 
judgement, concluded the psychologist would 
have visited the accused in the hospital had the 
police not intervened. She, upon hearing the 
accused was in hospital, expressed an interest in 
seeing him to inform him that his primary 
counsellor had been in an accident and was 
unavailable. She alone made the decision to visit 
the accused and no police officer attempted to 
contact her after she left the police station. 
She then contacted the police because she felt 
she had a professional ethical obligation to do so. 
She was then asked by police to tell the accused, 
and did convey the information at her next visit, 
that she may be compellable as a witness and 
that he did not have to talk to her.  
 
The psychologist visited the accused on her own 
and was neither instructed to nor manipulated 
into doing so by the police. The psychologist was 
acting independently and the police did not trick, 
coerce, or force the psychologist to cooperate. 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
 Volume 4 Issue 6             www.jibc.bc.ca 
November/December 2004 
9
NO-KNOCK ENTRY VIOLATES 
CHARTER  
R. v. Ngo & Ngo, 2004 BCSC 1414 
 
The police obtained a search 
warrant to search the accused’s 
residence for marihuana. When 
they executed the warrant, 
they did not knock and 
announce their presence. Rather, they checked 
the door to see if it was locked and used a 
battering ram to break it down, entering with 
their guns drawn and yelling “police”. During a 
voire dire to determine the admissibility of 
evidence, the accused argued that the search 
was unreasonably carried out because of the 
absence of an announcement, thus violating s. 8 
of the Charter. As a result, they submitted the 
evidence should be excluded under s.24(2).  
 
The police stated they used the no knock 
procedure because it offered surprise and 
addressed safety concerns. However, British 
Columbia Supreme Court Justice Stromberg-
Stein found this method unnecessary based on 
the circumstances. In her view, entering 
simultaneously with announcement or waiting a 
split second before forcing entry is not knock 
and announce, but rather knock and crash in.    
 
In this case she held that there were no safety 
issues, since the main investigator indicated that 
prior to the search a briefing was held to discuss 
officer safety concerns, but there were none. 
There was no evidence the police made any 
inquiries about the premises that would have led 
them to believe there was a danger if they did 
not announce there presence. Neither police 
policy nor police practice is sufficient, by itself, 
to waive the knock and announce rule. The 
evidence was excluded and the charges of 
marihuana production and possession for the 
purpose of trafficking were dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
REQUEST FOR ID NOT A 
DETENTION 
R. v. Nguyen, 2004 BCCA 546 
 
While arriving at a home to 
execute a search warrant for 
electricity theft, the police saw 
a van parked directly in front of 
the house. This vehicle was registered to a 
person wanted on an outstanding warrant for 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. The residence was entered and 
police found a marihuana grow operation in the 
basement that could be accessed through a 
locked door. A key for the door was found inside, 
but no one was home. 
 
One of the officers exited the house to get 
something from his vehicle when he saw a 
Vietnamese male coming from the back yard 
between the residence and a neighbouring house. 
The officer said “police” and the man responded 
he was there to visit a friend. After being asked 
to produce identification, the man provided a 
driver’s licence in the name of the van’s 
registered owner.  
 
The accused was arrested on the outstanding 
warrant and Chartered. He was then searched 
and police found a keys that opened the van and 
the unlocked door to the residence. At trial in 
British Columbia Provincial Court, the keys were 
admitted as evidence and the accused was 
convicted of unlawfully producing marihuana and 
theft of electricity. He appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that 
the evidence was obtained through an arbitrary 
detention contrary to s.9 and an unreasonable 
search and seizure contrary to s.8 of the 
Charter and that it should be ruled inadmissible 
under s.24(2).  
 
Citing the recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decision R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, Justice 
Saunders for the unanimous court noted that 
“the police cannot be said to ‘detain’, within the 
meaning of ss.9 and 10 of the Charter, every 
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suspect they stop for the purposes of 
identification, or even interview” and the rights 
recognized by those sections are not engaged if 
there is “no significant physical or psychological 
restraint”. Justice Saunders stated: 
 
The exchange which led to the identification 
being provided was brief.  It occurred at a 
crime scene.  [The accused] was on the 
property, having come from the rear.  
Whether the [accused] was a suspect or a 
witness, or neither, a reasonable person in 
possession of the information [the officer] 
had would expect a police officer to ask him 
whom he was and what he was doing on the 
premises. [para. 16] 
 
Thus, there was no detention at the time of the 
identification request and therefore an enquiry 
into whether s.9 or s.10 had been violated at 
that moment did not arise. 
 
With respect to whether the identification 
request was a breach of s.8, Justice Saunders 
held: 
 
Counsel for [the accused] also complained that 
the request for identification, and [the 
accused’s] provision of it by way of a driver's 
licence, was a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.  
That is, he contends that there was some 
improper constraint upon [the accused] which 
resulted in him identifying himself by name and 
birthdate, by producing a driver's licence.  I 
do not agree.  For the reasons expressed 
above, in the circumstances [the detective’s] 
request of [the accused] that he identify 
himself, and his review of the driver's license 
produced, was not a Charter violation.  That 
information, in my view, was not obtained 
through a Charter breach. [para. 18] 
 
As for the search following arrest, it was proper 
as an incident thereto. The accused had been 
lawfully arrested once he was identified as the 
person wanted on the warrant. The keys were 
discovered during that lawful search and it was 
not unreasonable.   The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
GLOBAL SIX YEAR SENTENCE 
FIT FOR TWO OVER 80mg% 
CHARGES  
R. v. Newhouse, 2004 BCCA 569 
 
The accused, a 61 year old man, 
pled guilty to two charges of 
driving with a blood alcohol 
content over 80mg% that 
occurred approximately three 
months apart. In neither of these incidents was 
anyone injured nor was there property damage. 
As well, he pled guilty to one count of prohibited 
driving under British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle 
Act and one count of driving while disqualified 
under the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to 
three years on each over 80mg% charge, to be 
served consecutively, and given a $300 fine and 
7 days in jail on the Motor Vehicle Act 
prohibition and a lifetime driving prohibition and 
one year concurrent sentence on the Criminal 
Code disqualification charge.  
 
At sentencing, the judge inferred the accused 
was an alcoholic because he admitted it to police 
and had 17 prior convictions for either impaired 
driving or driving with a blood alcohol content 
over 80mg%. However, the judge said he was not 
punishing him for being an alcoholic, but rather 
for his arrogance and “the selfishness of 
constantly getting drunk and driving and 
exposing the public to risk.” Furthermore, the 
accused’s refusal to follow court orders and the 
fact he was on bail during the second impaired 
charge, provided aggravating circumstances 
warranting public protection.  
 
The accused appealed his sentence arguing that 
a six year sentence was too long and that a three 
year sentence could adequately address the 
sentencing objectives. As the accused pointed 
out, he had been conviction free from 1986 to 
1995, with his last conviction in 1998.  However, 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal disagreed, 
stating: 
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No error in principle was suggested that could 
give rise to a reconsideration of the 
appropriate sentence for the [accused].  The 
individual sentence for each of the offences 
was within the appropriate range for like 
offences for offenders, even offenders with 
less serious records.  Moreover, the totality of 
the sentence was fit, including as it did a 
lifetime prohibition on driving.  The trial judge 
was right in this case to consider the primary 
need to protect the public.  The protection of 
the public from this [accused’s] driving 
demanded the sentence the trial judge gave. 
[para. 10] 
 
The appeal against the length of sentence was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
24 HOUR PROHIBITION 
CONSIDERED IN IMPAIRED 
SENTENCING 
R. v. Longul, 2004 BCCA 562 
 
The accused pled guilty to 
impaired driving after driving his 
vehicle into a chain link fence at 
a ball park where a game was in 
progress. Two breathalyzer tests subsequently 
obtained showed readings of 200mg%. The 
accused had 38 separate convictions on his 
criminal record between 1986 and 2000, three 
of which were for impaired driving, one for 
driving over 80mg%, eight for driving while 
prohibited or disqualified and five for failure to 
attend court. As well, his driving record showed 
six Motor Vehicle Act offences for driving while 
prohibited or suspended and one for no 
insurance. His most recent driving record entry 
was a 24-hour driving prohibition under s.215 of 
the Motor Vehicle Act. The sentencing judge 
rejected the accused’s call for a suspended or 
conditional sentence, instead sentencing him to 
nine months in jail and a two year driving 
prohibition. 
 
The accused appealed, arguing that his sentence 
should be reduced because the sentencing judge 
placed to much emphasis on the length of his 
criminal record that contained only three dated 
impaired driving convictions, the most recent of 
which was 10 years old. Moreover, he submitted 
that his voluntary payment of $2,700 to repair 
the property damage was enough of a penalty to 
satisfy sentencing principles, including general 
and specific deterrence as well as denunciation.  
 
In rejecting the accused appeal for leniency, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the 
sentencing judge did not err in imposing the nine 
month sentence. The judge neither erred in 
principle nor overlooked nor overemphasized any 
relevant sentencing factor. In dismissing the 
appeal on behalf of the unanimous court, Justice 
Rowles stated: 
 
In March 2002, he received a 24-hour driving 
prohibition under s. 215 of the Motor Vehicle 
Act.  That section does not create an offence; 
rather, it provides that a peace officer may, if 
the peace officer has reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that a driver's ability to 
drive a motor vehicle is affected by alcohol or 
a drug, serve the driver with a notice of a 24-
hour driving prohibition.  While the s. 215 
prohibition cannot be treated as having the 
same force as a conviction for impaired 
driving, it seems to me that such a prohibition, 
particularly when taken together with [the 
accused’s] record for related offences and the 
circumstances of the offence for which he was 
being sentenced, undermines any suggestion 
that the offence for which he was being 
sentenced ought to be treated as an 
unfortunate lapse or an isolated event.  Given 
his prior record for drinking-driving offences, 
it would be reasonable for the trial judge to 
have inferred that [the accused] had failed to 
recognize the serious dangers and 
consequences that can result from drinking 
and driving and that both specific and general 
deterrence, as well as denunciation, had to be 
given considerable weight in sentencing in this 
case. [para. 14] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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ROBBERY TEST PARTLY 
SUBJECTIVE & OBJECTIVE 
R. v. Bourassa, 2004 NSCA 127 
 
The accused was charged with 
robbery under s.344 of the 
Criminal Code after he 
approached a bank teller’s 
wicket wearing a hooded jacket, 
put on sunglasses, and pulled out a note. He told 
her that he wanted large bills while keeping one 
hand in his pocket at all times. The teller, who 
had been robbed before, froze and did not hand 
over the money. The accused then crossed the 
wicket, reached into the till, and grabbed the 
bills before leaving the bank. Although she did 
not actually see a weapon, the teller assumed the 
accused was holding one in his pocket. The 
accused was convicted in Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court, but appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in determining whether a robbery or 
simply a theft had occurred.  
 
Section 343 of the Criminal Code defines 
robbery in several ways, including when a person 
“uses violence or threats of violence to a person 
or property” while they steal (s.343(a)). Steal is 
defined in s.2 of the Criminal Code as committing 
“theft”. In examining the difference between 
theft and robbery, Justice Saunders, for the 
unanimous appeal court, stated: 
 
"Theft" is defined generally in s. 322. Also 
relevant in this case is s. 588 which concerns 
the ownership of property, here the financial 
institution's money. From these definitions and 
the jurisprudence which has considered them, 
one sees that in simplistic terms the 
difference between "robbery" and "theft" is 
that robbery is committed by confronting and 
intimidating the person whose property is 
taken, whereas theft is committed without 
violence or threats of violence, and often 
occurs secretly, such that the victim is left 
unaware of being relieved of their property. 
[para. 7] 
 
The “uses violence or threats of violence” 
characterization of robbery under s.343(a) is 
usually applied to robberies not involving weapons 
or imitations, or personal violence. In deciding 
whether a robber’s conduct amounted to using 
threats of violence, a partly subjective and 
partly objective test may be used. In holding 
that the trial judge correctly concluded that a 
robbery occurred in this case, Justice Saunders 
wrote: 
 
[The teller] said she was frightened and angry 
to find herself again the victim of a bank 
robbery. Such evidence was clearly subjective, 
but was certainly relevant to the 
determination of whether she felt threatened 
by the conduct and whether such fear was 
reasonable under the circumstances.    To 
simply isolate one or two actions of the thief 
as the appellant suggests, presents a distorted 
view. The better approach is to examine the 
entire sequence of events through the eyes of 
a reasonable observer who happened upon the 
scene. When assessing, objectively, whether 
such fear was reasonable, many features of 
the incident would be especially persuasive, for 
example: the individual had the hood of his 
jacket up over his head as he approached the 
wicket; then after putting his sunglasses on, 
and keeping his right hand in his pocket, 
passed the teller a note, and by some gesture 
and grunting sounds made it clear that he 
wanted the large bills.    When the teller froze 
and was unable to react, he reached across the 
till, grabbed the money and fled. [para 15] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
11 HOUR DETENTION OF 
IMPAIRED DRIVER ARBITRARY 
R. v. Iseler,  
2004 Docket: C41473 (OntCA) 
 
A police officer came upon the 
accused sleeping in his vehicle 
parked on the roadside. The 
vehicle was running and its high 
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beams were on. The accused fumbled for his 
driver’s licence and the officer detected a smell 
of alcohol on his breath. A roadside screening 
device was administered and the accused failed. 
He was arrested, allowed to speak with a lawyer, 
and provided two breath samples with readings 
registering 177mg% and 175mg%. He was placed 
in a cell at 5 am and about three or four hours 
later attempted to get the attention of police 
because—feeling ill—he needed toilet paper to 
use the toilet. He gestured to the security 
camera, rattled the bars, and shouted—but 
received no response. An hour later he again 
tried to get the guard’s attention, but was 
unsuccessful. At about 3 pm he was thrown a 
submarine sandwich and was released an hour 
later. 
 
During his eleven hour detention, he had no 
contact with anyone other than the five second 
encounter with the officer throwing him the 
sandwich. The accused had money to take a taxi 
home or his wife could have picked him up. At his 
trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused sought a stay of proceedings arguing he 
was arbitrarily detained and imprisoned under 
s.9 of the Charter. The judge concluded he was 
not arbitrarily detained and his application was 
rejected. Instead, he was convicted as charged. 
He again launched an appeal to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice, but it was dismissed. 
He appealed once more, this time to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal.  
 
Justice Armstrong, authoring the unanimous 
appeal judgment, found that there had been an 
arbitrary detention. There was no evidence of an 
assessment of the accused’s level of sobriety 
that may have warranted continued detention. 
Furthermore, “the police either paid no attention 
to the gesturing, or they were unaware of it 
because they simply failed to monitor the 
security camera. In either case, those 
responsible for his incarceration and well-being 
would appear to have failed in their duty”. This 
was an 11 hour detention in which the accused 
was ignored but for a five second encounter at 
the tenth hour. The accused had presented a 
prima facie case of arbitrary detention and the 
Crown left it unanswered.  
 
Despite the arbitrary detention however, 
Ontario’s highest court found a stay of 
proceedings would be inappropriate in this case: 
 
While the police conduct in failing to monitor 
the accused was inexcusable, it is important to 
note that the breach of the [accused’s] s. 9 
Charter rights occurred post-offence. The 
breach had nothing to do with the 
investigation and the gathering of evidence 
against him. It did not impact on trial fairness. 
As Morden A.C.J.O. said in Sapusak [[1998] 
O.J. No. 4148], "[t]here was no temporal or 
causal connection between the breach and the 
obtaining of the evidence". I am accordingly 
satisfied that this is not "the clearest of 
cases" warranting the grant of a stay of 
proceedings. [para 31] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
WHOLE PICTURE MUST BE 
CONSIDERED FOR SEARCH 
WARRANT 
R. v. Saunders, 2004 SCC 70 
 
Three confidential police 
informants provided information 
that the accused was receiving 
hash oil and keeping it at his 
house. One source told police he had bought 
some at the accused’s house while the two other 
sources said drugs were there. On the basis of 
this information the police obtained a Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act search warrant, 
executed it, and found drugs and money. The 
accused was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
 
At his trial in the Provincial Court of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, the trial judge 
ruled the police had violated the accused’s s.8 
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Charter right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. In his view, the warrant was 
improperly issued by the justice of the peace. As 
a result, the evidence was excluded under 
s.24(2) and the accused was acquitted.  
 
The Crown successfully appealed to the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal  
(2003 NLCA 63) arguing that the trial judge 
failed to examine the “totality of the 
circumstances” when assessing the sufficiency 
of the information used to support the warrant. 
In the 2:1 judgment, the appeal was allowed and 
a new trial was ordered. In the majority’s 
opinion, “the trial judge ‘deconstructed’ every 
paragraph (and many phrases within paragraphs) 
in the information to obtain, concluding they 
suffered from some inadequacy.” As Chief 
Justice Wells noted: 
 
…the trial judge engaged in a critique of the 
information to obtain ... almost as if he were 
correcting a student's term paper ... and not 
an assessment of the sufficiency of the 
information in the "totality of the 
circumstances". The approach taken by the 
trial judge was like that of a person who 
views a painting square centimetre by square 
centimetre to identify defects ... which has 
its place ... but then fails to step back and 




If one "deconstructs" each item of 
information from source "A" and then that 
from source "B" and then that from source 
"C" and applies the test as against each item 
individually, as did the Trial Judge, then the 
answer may well be "no", as the trial judge 
concluded. But, if one considers the "totality 
of the circumstances" one sees that the 
information from the three sources is 
corroborative inter se; because of this, the 
whole of their information becomes greater 
than the sum of its parts. To put it another 
way, the sequence of pictures drawn by the 
three sources tells a consistent story: [The 
accused] sold hash oil, he kept it at his 
residence, he had hash oil at his residence on 
April 1, 2001. As such the whole could enable 
the justice of the peace to conclude that 
credibly-based probability had replaced 
suspicion. [para. 15] 
 
As a result, the majority viewed the whole 
picture as capable of supporting the search 
warrant. Justice Welsh, on the other hand, 
disagreed with the majority. In his opinion, a 
careful paragraph by paragraph review was 
necessary to assess the reliability of various 
pieces of information to identify any 
deficiencies in order to determine whether the 
totality of the circumstances lacked a valid or 
substantial foundation. He found that there was 
insufficient information to establish the 
reliability of any of the informants, even if their 
information was consistent with each other. 
Further independent police corroboration could 
have buttressed the warrant, but was not 
undertaken. Welsh found the search warrant 
invalid, the resultant search a s.8 Charter 
violation, and would have dismissed the Crown’s 
appeal.  
 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In a short oral judgment dismissing the 
appeal, Chief Justice McLachlin, for a five 
member Supreme Court, affirmed the order of 
the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal. 
In her view, there was sufficient information 
before the issuing justice to support the 
granting of the search warrant. 
 
Complete cases available online at www.canlii.org 
 
BC POLICE HONOURED 
 
Many of British 
Columbia’s finest police 
officers were honoured 
on November 18, 2004 
at Government House in Victoria. They were 
selected by a committee comprised of 
representatives from the British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of Police and Police 
Services Division, Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General. Awards were presented for 
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either valour or meritorious service. The criteria 
for the awards are as follows: 
 
Valour (gold coloured) is the highest award for a 
police officer in British Columbia and involves an 
act of exceptional valour in the face of extreme 
hazard. It is awarded to police officers who 
purposely took action for the benefit of others 
while knowing that, in doing so, they placed 
themselves at substantial risk of death or 
serious injury.  
 
Meritorious Service (silver coloured) is 
exemplary performance that enhances the image 
of police officers in British Columbia. It is 
awarded to police officers who clearly 
demonstrated that they acted in a manner 
significantly beyond the standard normally 
expected.  
 
Awards of Valour 
 
Sergeant Rhen Hallett, Delta Police Department, 
for apprehending a violent male who, armed with 
a rifle, threatened the lives of several citizens. 
 
Constable Dan McLean, Constable Derek 
Gallamore, and Constable Phillip DiBattista, Delta 
Police Department for apprehending armed and 
violent suspects, one of who was armed with a 
handgun, who were threatening the lives of 
several citizens. 
 
Constable Chad Gargus, Delta Police Department, 
for rescuing a suicidal male from the outside 
railing of the Alex Fraser Bridge. 
 
Constable Dave Walker and Constable Richard 
Vanstone, Vancouver Police Department, for 
apprehending a violent male who, armed with 
knives, threatened to cause harm to family 
members. 
 
Constable Dina Tzetzos, Vancouver Police 
Department, for saving the life of a suicidal male 
who was stabbing himself with a knife. 
 
Constable Tony Blouin and Constable Silvana 
Burtini, Vancouver Police Department, for saving 
the life of a suicidal male attempting to jump 
from a viaduct. 
 
Constable Pamela Falconer (currently serving 
with West Shore RCMP) and Constable Kelly 
Falconer (currently serving with West Shore 
RCMP) for apprehending a violent male who, while 
armed with a knife, threatened fellow officers. 
 
Constable Dave Piket, Prince Rupert RCMP, for 
rescuing two occupants from a submerged 
vehicle. 
 
Constable Sandi Swanson and Constable Paul 
Bouwman, Salmon Arm RCMP, for apprehending a 
distraught male armed with a shotgun. 
 
Constable Rico Wong (currently serving with 
RCMP "E" Division, Integrated National Safety 
Enforcement Team), for his drug investigation in 
Fiji leading to successful convictions. 
 
Corporal Willie Hornseth, Kelowna RCMP 
Detachment, for apprehending a violent suspect 
who, armed with a handgun, threatened a fellow 
officer. 
 
Constable Wahnese Antonioni-Stevens (currently 
serving with Alexis Creek RCMP) and Constable 
Steven Croft, Mission RCMP Detachment, for 
saving a suicidal male who attempted to jump 
from an overpass railing. 
 
Constable Cameron Joseph (currently serving 
with Penticton RCMP), for apprehending a violent 
male who had caused him personal injury. 
 
Awards for Valour During Forest Fire 
Season 2003 
 
Staff Sergeant Allen Olsen, (currently serving 
with Boundary Regional RCMP) and Constable 
Todd Vande Pol, Barriere RCMP (currently 
serving with Lytton RCMP), for evacuating 
several communities threatened by the 2003 
Lewis Creek forest fires. 
 
Staff Sergeant John Folk, (currently serving 
with Central Interior RCMP Highway Patrol), 
Sergeant Rick Bigland, (currently serving with 
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Summerland RCMP) and Constable Larry Boak, 
(currently serving with Central Interior RCMP 
Highway Patrol), for evacuating the village of 
Pritchard during the 2003 forest fire season. 
 
Corporal Don Longpre, (currently serving with 
RCMP "E" Division, Security Engineering 
Section), Constable Denise Bendfeld, Chase 
RCMP and Constable Mark Skotnicki, Chase 
RCMP, for evacuating the McGillvery Lake shore 
and the Kamloops Shuswap Road area during the 
2003 Forest Fires. 
 
Sergeant Garry Kerr, (currently serving with 
Southeast District RCMP HQ, Kamloops) for 





Sergeant Ross Poulton, Saanich Police 
Department, for pursuing an investigation 
involving a series of fires that resulted in the 
conviction of a serial arsonist. 
 
Detective Constable Les Yeo, Vancouver Police 
Department, for his investigation of a jewellery 
store robbery led to several charges being laid. 
 
Constable Kevin Lastiwka, Constable Paul 
Spencelayh and Constable Rae Robirtis , Victoria 
Police Department, for rescuing residents from a 
burning apartment building. 
 
Constable Paul Brookes, Victoria Police 
Department, for his contributions and dedication 
leading to the development and delivery of the 
"Youth Combating Intolerance Conference" held 
on Thetis Island. 
 
Constable Jana Hardy and Constable Dale 
Sleightholme, Victoria Police Department, for 
saving the life of a drowning male. 
 
Constable Marc Searle, Surrey RCMP, for 
volunteering numerous hours of community 
service. 
 
Corporal Michael Pacholuk, RCMP “E” Division 
Major Crimes Section, Staff Sergeant Glenn 
Magark, RCMP “E” Division Major Crimes Section, 
Corporal Stephen Thatcher, RCMP "E" Division, 
Vancouver Commercial Crime, and Sergeant 
Gerry Peters (currently serving with RCMP "E" 
Division, Criminal Operations Policy), for their 
eight-year investigation of child abuse at Native 
Indian residential schools in B.C. resulting in 
several  Criminal Code charges. 
 
Awards for Meritorious Service During 
Forest Fire Season 2003 
 
• Superintendent William McKinnon (currently 
serving with SE District RCMP HQ, Kelowna)  
• Staff Sergeant Kerry Solinsky, Kelowna RCMP   
• Staff Sergeant Shawn Wylie (currently 
serving with Westbank RCMP)  
• Sergeant John Jordan, Kelowna RCMP 
• Staff Sergeant Peter McLaren (currently 
serving with SE District RCMP HQ, Kelowna)  
• Staff Sergeant Henk Wamsteeker (currently 
serving with SE District RCMP HQ, Kelowna)  
• Sergeant Darryl R. Little (currently serving 
with Nelson RCMP)  
• Corporal Kevin Keane (currently serving with 
Boundary Regional RCMP)  
• Corporal Rick McIsaac, Nakusp RCMP 
• Staff Sergeant Terry Miles (currently 
serving with Island District RCMP HQ, 
Victoria)  
• Staff Sergeant Norm McPhail (currently 
serving with Whistler RCMP)  
• Corporal Brian Hunter, Salmon Arm RCMP  
• Constable Kevin Christensen (currently 
serving with Creston RCMP)  
• Staff Sergeant Dave Williams (currently 
serving with Salmon Arm RCMP)  
• Constable Darren Bonang (currently serving 
with Central Interior RCMP Highway Patrol)  
• Staff Sergeant Len Carlson (currently serving 
with North Okanagan RCMP)  
• Sergeant Kirk Nevison, Kamloops RCMP 
• Corporal Steve Nordstrum (currently serving 
with RCMP HQ, Emergency Response Team, 
Ottawa)  
• Constable Glenn Beattie, Kamloops RCMP 
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• Sergeant Dennis Bauhuis (currently serving 
with Kamloops Rural RCMP)  
• Corporal Mark Jorgenson, Cranbrook RCMP 
• Constable Derren Perpelitz, Cranbrook RCMP 
• Sergeant Brian Richard Roy Edmondson, 
Cranbrook RCMP 
• Constable John Ferguson (currently serving 





FIVE YEAR SENTENCE FOR 
PURSUIT CAUSE INJURY FIT 
R. v. Breton, 2004 ABCA 391 
 
Just days after completing a 
seven year and two month 
sentence for dangerous driving, 
theft, and obstructing a police 
officer, the accused was stopped at a random 
check-stop driving a vehicle with the wrong 
licence plate. He could not produce the vehicle 
registration , insurance, or his driver’s licence 
and was asked to turn off the vehicle. He did not 
and appeared to be about to drive off. The 
officer reached in to turn off the vehicle, 
became entangled in the seatbelt and a struggle 
ensued, with both exchanging blows. The accused 
drove off at a high rate of speed and dragged 
the officer for four  blocks before the officer 
fell onto the roadway, suffering only minor 
physical injuries but heavily damaging his boots, 
clothing, holster and firearm. A police pursuit 
followed and the accused was stopped by a spike 
belt and collision with a parked vehicle. In the 
vehicle police found a stolen licence plate, 
jewelry, a screwdriver, pliers and binoculars.  
 
The accused entered an early guilty plea to 
flight causing bodily harm, leaving the scene of 
the accident, and possession of break-in 
instruments. While Crown sought a four to six 
year sentence and the accused only four years, 
the Alberta Provincial Court judge sentenced him 
to five years on the flight charge and one year 
concurrent on the other two charges. The 
accused appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing the sentence overemphasized 
denunciation and deterrence, was not 
proportionate to the offence since the officer 
was not seriously injured and gave too little 
weight to the early guilty pleas.  
 
In dismissing the appeal, Alberta’s top court 
noted: 
 
Section 249.1 of the Criminal Code, involving 
flight or evasion from a peace officer, is 
intended to protect the public and the police 
when a person operating a motor vehicle being 
pursued by the police fails to stop as soon as is 
reasonable. The maximum penalty where bodily 
harm occurs is 14 years. This is significant 
because the maximum penalty for impaired 
driving causing bodily harm or negligence 
causing bodily harm is 10 years. [para. 8] 
 
In finding no error in the sentencing judge’s 
decision, the court stated: 
 
In the case before us, the sentencing judge 
specifically identified the mitigating factors 
of the guilty plea, the apology showing 
remorse, and the one month spent in custody. 
He took them into account in sentencing the 
[accused] to 5 years. There is no basis for 
finding that he gave too little weight to the 
guilty plea. 
 
He also considered the very aggravating factor 
that the [accused] tried to shake the police 
officer off in order to escape. He said that it 
was evident that the [accused] did not care 
whether the police officer would be injured or 
killed by his actions. While the injuries turned 
out to be minor, there was an actual risk and it 
was very great. The [accused’s] actions showed 
a disregard for the lives and safety of others. 
An accused who evades police is morally 
blameworthy for the risk created. The 
accused’s reckless behaviour was a serious 
aggravating factor in this case. [para. 18-19] 
 
The global five year sentence was a fit and 
proper sentence, even though there were only 
minor physical injuries to the officer. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
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BAR ID CHECK FOR WARRANTS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
R. v. Skeet, 2004 MBPC 10141 
 
Eight police officers attended a 
bar to do a spot check project 
whereby they would spread out 
through the bar, randomly walk 
up to individuals and request identification to 
determine if  they were wanted on warrants. No 
one had called the police nor was there any 
criminal conduct requiring police intervention. 
Officers approached the accused’s table where 
he was drinking from a bottle of beer and asked 
him for identification. He produced a picture 
driver’s licence. He was checked on CPIC and was 
found to be bound by a probation order requiring 
him to abstain from the consumption or 
possession of alcohol. As a result, the accused 
was charged with breaching his probation. 
 
At his trial in Manitoba Provincial Court, the 
accused admitted he had been drinking but 
testified officers were blocking the exits to the 
bar, did not tell him he could refuse to identify 
himself, and felt he did not have any option but 
to do what he was told. He argued his s.8, s.9, 
and s.10 Charter rights were violated, while the 
Crown submitted there were no Charter 
breaches because there had been no detention 
until the CPIC checked revealed the probation 
order. 
 
Justice Garfinkel concluded the accused had 
been both physically and psychologically detained 
when they asked for identification—he felt he 
could not or should not refuse. The police action 
was “compulsive”—the officers wore police 
attire, their weapons and equipment were visible, 
they prevented people from leaving, and they did 
not tell people they did not have to produce 
identification nor answer questions. In Justice 
Garfinkel’s view, “people have the right to drink 
or eat in a public bar or restaurant without 
police approaching and asking, without any cause 
articulated, to produce identification”. There 
was no observable illegal activity, no disturbance, 
or no assault upon which to take police action. 
Thus, the accused’s Charter rights were violated 
by this deliberate police action to check for 
warrants.  
 
Since the identification provided by the accused 
was conscriptive—he was detained and compelled 
to produce it—the trial would be rendered 
unfair. Furthermore, the Charter violation was 
serious. The accused was not suspected of doing 
anything illegal and the degree of intrusiveness 
was more than minimal in the circumstances. The 
admission of the evidence would therefore bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
9-1-1 ENTRY LOGICAL & 
LAWFUL 
R. v. Havelock, 2004 MBQB 189 
 
The police received a 9-1-1 hang 
up call from an apartment suite. 
On call back a female answered, 
said it was a joke, and lied 
about her name. A male voice then came on the 
phone and told the call taker off. About 15 
minutes later, two officers arrived at the suite 
and could hear yelling from inside. They heard 
the accused yell, “Shut the fuck up. You fucking 
bitch” and a female take blame for calling 9-1-1. 
The accused said he didn’t “care if the fucking 
cops came.”  
 
The police knocked on the door and the accused 
opened it, yelling and asking what they wanted. 
The officer asked if the police could come in and 
talk, but the accused became angry, said “no”, 
and blocked the doorway by standing in the 
middle of it. The officer explained the police 
would have to come in and ensure everything was 
okay because of the yelling and the 9-1-1 hang up 
call. The officer took a step to pass by, but the 
accused lunged and pushed the officer 
backwards, both losing their balance and falling 
to the floor. A struggle ensued—one officer 
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trying to handcuff while a second tried to 
restrain his legs while being kicked at. The 
accused was subsequently restrained and 
convicted in Manitoba Provincial Court of 
assaulting a peace officer in the execution of his 
duty.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench arguing the 
trial judge erred in finding the officer acting in 
the lawful execution of his duty. In his opinion, 
the officer was exercising an unjustifiable use 
of police powers when he attempted to enter the 
suite. He submitted that the police could have 
determined the health and safety of the female 
without going inside the suite—such as asking 
the accused to have her come to the door or 
calling out to her to come to the door herself. 
The Crown, on the other hand, contended the 
officer was engaged in the execution of his duty 
when he attempted to enter the suite, which was 
justified in the circumstances.  
 
Justice Hanssen of the Manitoba Court of 
Queen’s Bench agreed with the Crown and 
dismissed the accused’s appeal. In his view, 
there was no doubt “the police officers had a 
duty at common law to ascertain the reason for 
the 911 call and to ensure that [the female] was 
safe.”  Furthermore, the officer’s attempt to 
enter the suite did not involve an unjustifiable 
use of police powers associated with that duty. 
Justice Hanssen stated: 
 
[The officer’s] attempt to enter the suite in 
the manner he did was justifiable considering 
the totality of the circumstances. The police 
officers were responding to a disconnected 
911 call. They had a duty to act to protect life 
and safety. They had a duty to respond to the 
call. Once they arrived at [the accused’s] 
suite, they had a duty to ascertain the reason 
for the call. They had no indication as to the 
nature of the problem. They did not know 
whether the call related to a criminal offence. 
When they arrived they heard a heated 
argument taking place in the suite. They heard 
[the accused] yelling loudly. When he answered 
the door he was hostile and uncooperative. The 
officers could not see [the female] inside the 
suite. They did not know whether she had been 
injured and might be in need of assistance. 
The fact that [the accused] tried to block the 
doorway contributes to the appropriateness of 
[the officer’s] response. 
 
Given [the accused’s] belligerent and 
uncooperative mood, it would have been 
pointless for the officers to have asked him to 
have [the female] come to the door. It is 
obvious he would not have complied. It was also 
reasonable for them not to call out to [the 
female] to come to the door. This might have 
resulted in unnecessary delay in rendering 
assistance to her. In fact, given [the 
accused’s] hostile frame of mind it is possible 
she would have been exposed to some danger 
if she had come to the door to speak with the 
officers. Moreover, it would have been more 
appropriate for them to deal with her in the 
privacy of the suite instead of a public hallway. 
 
Under the circumstances, it was logical and 
lawful for [the accused] to attempt to enter 
the suite without [his] permission. … [The 
officer] hoped to gain entry without having to 
use any force. This is why he tried to step 
around [the accused]. Had he been successful 
in gaining entry in this manner the 
interference with [the accused’s] privacy 
would have been minimal and brief. [The 
officer’s] intention was merely to ascertain 
the health and safety of [the female] and to 
provide whatever assistance she might require. 
He did not intend to intrude any further on 
[the accused’s] privacy than was necessary in 
order to achieve these goals. [paras. 16-18] 
 
The officer’s attempted entry into the suite was 
reasonable. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that a new federal law makes it an offence to 
make a terrorist hoax. Real acts of terrorism 
are already criminal offences, but s.82.231 of 
the Criminal Code fills a gap in the existing law 
by creating an offence, punishable by a maximum 
life in prison—if death results—for terrorist 
hoaxes.  
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There are several new Bills 
before Parliament that may 
impact police officers and how 
they do their job. These Bills 
include C-16 and C-17. 
 
Bill C-16 (first reading only:  
November 1, 2004) 
 
New amendments to the Criminal Code provisions 
respecting impairment by alcohol or drug have 
been proposed, including authorizing specially 
trained peace officers—known as evaluating 
officers—to conduct physical coordination tests 
(prescribed by regulation) to determine whether 
a person is impaired by a drug or a combination 
of drugs and alcohol. Furthermore, the new 
section will allow police to take bodily fluid 
samples to test for the presence of drugs or a 
combination of drugs and alcohol in a person’s 
body.  
 
A person who fails or refuses, 
without reasonable excuse to 
comply with a demand to 
perform the physical 
coordination tests or provide 
urine tests commits an 
offence.  
 
Bill C-17 (first reading only: November 1, 
2004) 
 
Several amendments to the 
Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) have 
been re-introduced following 
the recent federal election. 
These proposed changes 
include reducing the maximum punishment, by 
fine only, and the possibility of “ticketing” 
processes for minor marihuana possession 
offences. Penalties for growing marihuana would 




In its bid to toughen 
penalties against marihuana 
growers, Parliament is 
proposing to double the 
current maximum sentence 
(proposed s.7(3) CDSA). 
Under the present law of 
producing marihuana (which 
includes cultivating, 
propagating, or harvesting 
the substance), a convicted 
grower can only receive a 
maximum of 7 years in 
prison. Under the new proposal, maximum 
sentences are based on the number of marihuana 
plants grown. The following sentencing grid 
shows the corresponding penalty attached to the 





This new legislation will “de-criminalize”, but not 
“de-legalize”, possession of small amounts of 
marihuana. Therefore, enforcement action can 
still be taken. Marihuana possession of amounts 
less than 30 grms. or hashish possession less than 
1 gram remain summary conviction only offences. 
However, maximum penalties for these offences 
have been reduced in some cases. 
# of plants Offence type Punishment 
1-3 Summary only <$500 adult 
<$250 young person 
4-25 Dual by indictment 
• <5 yrs. prison 
by summary  
• <$25,000 and/or 
• <18 mos. prison 
26-50 Indictable <10 yrs. prison 
51+ Indictable <14 yrs. prison 




Marihuana amounts in excess of 30 grams or 
hashish amounts in excess of 1 gram will continue 
to be a dual offence. If possession of these 
amounts proceeds by indictment, the maximum 
punishment available is imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 5 years less a day. If the offence 
is proceeded summarily, a first offence can draw 
up to 6 months in prison and/or a $1000 fine 
while a second or subsequent offences can bring 




A new section will place an affirmative duty on 
judges in some cases to justify why a person is 
not sent to jail (proposed s.10(2.1) CDSA). If an 
accused is convicted of a production offence 
where 4 or more plants are involved, but is not 
sentenced to imprisonment, the Court must give 
reasons why if: 
• the accused used real property belonging to 
a 3rd party to commit the offence; 
• the production was a potential security, 
health, or safety hazard to children at the 
location or in the immediate area; 
• the production was a potential public safety 
hazard in a residential area; or 
• the location was  set with a trap or other 
device likely to cause death or bodily harm. 
 
Complete copies of these and other proposed Bills are 
available at www.parl.gc.ca 
 
HUNCH INSUFFICIENT FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
R. v. Calderon & Stalas, 
(2004) Dockets: C38499 & C38500 
(OntCA) 
 
Ontario police officers 
stopped a rented Lincoln Town 
car with BC licence plates 
travelling 10 km/h over the 
speed limit at night on a highway. Inside the 
vehicle an officer saw several indicators 
suggesting the two occupants—who identified 
themselves and cooperated with police—were 
drug couriers. These items included cell phones, 
a pager, a road map, fast food wrappers, and two 
duffel bags. As well, the officer thought the 
vehicle appeared too expensive for the 
occupants to be driving. The driver exited the 
car on request and would not allow the police to 
search it. The officer then asked the 
passenger—who rented the car—if he could 
search the car and he said yes. As the passenger 
exited the car, the officer detected a fresh 
odour of marihuana, but his partner did not. The 
passenger withdrew his consent, but the officers 
searched the car anyways without informing the 
occupants of their right to counsel or 
considering a warrant. In the trunk of the car 
police found two duffel bags containing 22 lbs. 
of marihuana. The occupants were both arrested 
and advised of their right to counsel.  
 





< 1 grm.  
Adult = $300  





< 15 grms.  
Adult = $150  





If person in possession 
of <1 grm. of hashish 
or <15 grms. of 
marihuana: 
• is operating or in 
care & control of a 
motor vehicle, 
railway equip. 
aircraft, or vessel  
• while committing 
an indictable 
offence 
• in or near a school 
or school grounds 
Adult = $400  





more than 15 grms., 
but not more than 
30 grms. 
Option 
< $1000 fine 





Adult = $300  
YO = $200  
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At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, the accused were convicted after 
Justice Kurisko concluded there were no Charter 
violations. In his view, the stop was legitimately 
connected to highway traffic concerns and the 
officers also had articulable cause for 
suspecting there may be drugs in the car. Even if 
their were breaches of the Charter, the trial 
judge would have admitted the evidence under 
s.24(2). The accused were convicted of 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing their rights were violated under 
s.8 (unreasonable search or seizure), s.9 
(arbitrary detention) and s.10(b) (right to 
counsel) of the Charter. Crown conceded the 
accused’s rights under s.8 and 10(b) were 
infringed, but argued the trial judge was correct 
in finding no arbitrary detention and with his 
s.24(2) analysis.  
 
Search and Seizure 
 
Justices Laskin (with Feldman concurring) 
concluded that the Crown was correct in 
conceding the s.8 violation. The search was 
warrantless and presumed to be unreasonable. A 
warrantless search can be justified under the 
common law as either a search incidental to an 
investigative detention or incidental to arrest. 
Searches “incidental to an investigative 
detention can only be justified for protective 
purposes: officers must believe on reasonable 
and probable grounds, that their safety or the 
safety of others is at risk.” However, neither 
officer testified they searched for safety. 
Their search was to discover evidence of a 
crime—drugs—which could not be justified as an 
incident to investigative detention.  
 
A search incident to arrest may precede an 
arrest provided the officer had reasonable 
grounds to make an arrest prior to the search 
and the arrest follows on the heels of the 
search. However, the majority held that the 
police did not have the subjective or objective 
grounds to make the arrest before searching the 
trunk. Nor could the search be based on consent. 
Before the search of the trunk, one occupant 
refused to consent and the second occupant 
quickly withdrew his. Furthermore, both accused 
were detained prior to the search and had not 
been advised of their s.10(b) rights. Where a 
person is detained and the search depends upon 
their consent, the failure to advise them of their 





When the officers stopped the accused’s vehicle 
for speeding-10 km/h over the limit—it was a 
legitimate highway safety concern and the 
officer’s “suspicion about drugs did not taint the 
lawfulness of the initial stop.” However, the 
investigative detention related to drugs that 
followed would not be arbitrary only if the 
officer had an articulable cause, or reasonable 
grounds to detain the accused. As Justice Laskin 
noted: 
 
On an objective assessment of all of the 
circumstances, the officers had to have 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
[accused] were implicated in the 
transportation of drugs. The objectivity of the 
assessment is critical. An officer cannot 
exercise the power to detain on a hunch, even 
a hunch born of intuition gained by experience. 
[para. 69] 
 
In this case the officer testified to taking a one 
week drug interdiction course where he was 
trained on the indicators of drug couriers. He 
said the items he saw, along with his view that 
the occupants did not fit the expensive car they 
were driving led him to reasonably suspect they 
were drug couriers. But on cross examination he 
testified the indicators were neutral and might 
be found in any car. Furthermore, he said he had 
previously stopped between 10 and 20 cars with 
these indicators and made no arrests while his 
partner stopped between 50 and 100 cars 
without an arrest. 
 
Justice Laskin concluded the neutrality and 
apparent unreliability of these indicators did not 
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amount to reasonable grounds for detention and 
therefore the investigative detention was not 
justified and was arbitrary under s.9. 
 
Right to Counsel 
 
Justice Laskin ruled that when the police were 
looking for drugs the accused were at least 
physically restrained and therefore detained 
under the Charter which triggered their rights 




The majority held that the evidence should be 
excluded under s.24(2). Although the non-
conscriptive evidence would not affect trial 
fairness, the police committed three violations. 
There was no urgency or necessity and the 
violations were not inadvertent or technical. The 
police searched the trunk—an area with a 
reasonably high expectation of privacy—without 
a warrant or consent and did not have reasonable 
grounds to do so. Moreover, the police could have 





Justice Weiler, on the other hand, found the 
initial stop lawful. The stop was legal under s.216 
of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act and the 
officer’s motive of investigating possible drug 
smuggling, in addition to the highway safety 
concerns, did not taint the lawfulness of the 
stop. Furthermore, the police did have 
articulable cause to conduct an investigative 
detention. Although the individual factors by 
themselves were susceptible to innocent 
explanation, their totality was suspicious.  
 
However, the police unjustifiably used their 
power to detain since they did not advise the 
accused of their right to counsel before asking 
for their consent to search. Thus, although 
articulable cause existed, the detention was still 
arbitrary under s.9. But, unlike the majority, 
Justice Weiler would have found the evidence 
admissible under s.24(2). The accused had a 
reduced expectation of privacy in the vehicle, 
there was no oppressive police behaviour, no 
ongoing pattern of disregard for their rights, no 
deliberate breach of the Charter and the search 
was unobtrusive. Furthermore, the detention was 
brief before the police smelled the marihuana 
and thereby acquired reasonable grounds to 
effect the arrest and search incidental thereto. 
As well, the evidence was non-conscriptive real 
evidence discoverable in any event.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
ACTUAL ARREST NOT A 
PREREQUISITE TO SEARCH 
PROVIDED GROUNDS EXIST 
R. v. Dubois, 2004 BCCA 589 
 
Two police bicycle members on 
patrol detected a smell of 
burning marihuana as a car 
passed by them. The car turned 
into a parking lot and the 
officers rode up to it. An officer saw the driver 
raise a beer and take a drink. A strong odour of 
burning marihuana was detected coming from the 
car and an open beer was seen on the console 
area. The driver and his female passenger were 
asked to exit the car. At this time the female 
brushed what the police suspected was 
marihuana leaves or remnants from her pants 
and police saw residual marihuana leaf 
throughout the interior of the car.  
 
Both occupants were advised they were being 
detained for investigation of possession of a 
controlled substance and that the vehicle would 
be searched. A police dog was called to the 
scene, searched the car, and located a baggie of 
marihuana between the passenger seat and the 
passenger door, roaches in the ashtray, and a 
sum of money. The accused driver was told he 
was being detained and read the Charter and 
police warning. He was taken to the police 
detachment where a jail guard found a deck of 
cocaine in his pants.  
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At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the accused was acquitted of the marihuana 
found in the vehicle—since the judge was not 
satisfied he had control over it—but was 
convicted of possessing the cocaine. Although he 
argued that his rights under s.9 (arbitrary 
detention) and s.8 (unreasonable search and 
seizure) of the Charter had been violated, the 
trial judge ruled the police had reasonable 
grounds upon which to arrest the accused prior 
to the dog search. In his view, “a reasonable 
person would readily conclude that given the 
aroma emanating from the vehicle it was 
reasonable to conclude that one or both of the 
occupants had recently used marihuana within it 
and might do so again.”  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that the police did not 
arrest him prior to the dog search, and 
therefore the search incidental thereto was 
unreasonable. He contended that the odour of 
marihuana and the leafy substance on the 
female’s pants were insufficient grounds in any 
event upon which to base an arrest.  
 
Justice Huddart, authoring the unanimous 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, upheld the 
trial judge’s decision. In her view, an actual 
arrest is not a prerequisite to a search 
incidental to arrest provided there are 
reasonable grounds—both objective and 
subjective—upon which to arrest prior to the 
search. In this case, the police had reasonable 
and probable cause to arrest the accused before 
the dog search began. Evidence of marihuana 
odour alone in every circumstance is not 
necessarily insufficient to found an objective 
belief that a crime has been or is about to be 
committed. The trial judge’s finding that the 
officer had a subjective belief to arrest was 
supported by the evidence and her inference 
there was probably marihuana in the car was 
reasonable. The trial judge did not err and the 
appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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Registration fee includes tickets to the 
opening ceremonies and receptions, 
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 Dunblane School Massacre, 
Scotland, 1996 
 Gakhal Family Murders, Vernon, 
British Columbia, 1996 
 Ottawa Transpo Massacre, 
Ottawa, Ontario, 2001 
 Kamloops Murders, British 
Columbia, 2002 
 Port Arthur Massacre, Tasmania, 1996 
 Columbine High School Massacre, 1999 
 
Expert presenters include Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, 
U.S. Army (Retired), Director, Killology Research 
Group, who is one of the world's foremost experts in 
the field of human aggression, the roots of violence 
and violent crime. 
 
Visit www.fvlec.org for more info! 
